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STRENGTHENING THE FRONT LINE: Reduction 
and Sharing of Costs of RSA Aggression
SADCC has repeatedly called on the international community to use 
its influence to deter and halt South African aggression and 
destabilisation against its neighbours... calls for effective 
international action against apartheid... several states 
individually or collectively have instituted limited economic 
sanctions against South Africa. SADCC member States encourage 
these initiatives and urge that more effective measures be 
implemented.
- SADCC, Overview Paper for 1986 Harare 
Annual Consultative Conference
The effects of sanctions will call for great sacrifices among our 
peoples. We cannot stand against the sanctions campaign; thus we 
call upon the rest of the world that as it exercises what it feels
to be a moral duty it should... increase support to SADCC States so
as to cushion the indirect effects of sanctions to us.
- King Moshoeshoe II of Lesotho 
1985 Arusha SADCC Summit
The systematic destruction of the infrastructure indispensable to 
the functioning of our economies by South Africa's racist army is 
in the context of the survival of the racist regime which at all 
costs seeks to maintain the economic links of dependence created 
during colonialism. ...It is not difficult to conclude that it is 
natural for our countries', which have suffered losses at the hands 
of apartheid which surpass tens of billions, continuously strive 
for the speedy eradication of that regime since its existence is 
translated into grief, suffering, destruction and great economic 
backwardness. ... Accordingly we can categorically state that 
stability and security in this part of our continent depend on the 
elimination of apartheid. With apartheid peace is not possible and 
destruction will continue..
- President Eduardo dos Santos
1986 SADCC Summit, Luanda, August
Destructive Engagement: South Africa and Southern Africa
The Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe) and the broader Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC) grouping (the FLS plus Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi) have been on 
average hard hit by three factors. First, the general post 1979 economic 
crises affecting Sub-Saharan Africa, second, by recurrent droughts over
*
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1979-1984 and third, by the rising tide of South African aggression and 
destabilisation beginning with the 1975 invasion of Angola and becoming 
steadily more damaging since 1980. While the FLS are key to regional self 
defence, self definition and coordinated economic and security action it is 
not appropriate to consider the destructive engagement between South Africa 
and the independent states of Southern Africa without reference to the other 
three SADCC members, partly because both South Africa and the FLS/SADCC do 
perceive the regional division in these terms and act on that perception and 
partly because South Africa locked Lesotho is the most vulnerable Southern 
African country.
The SADCC economies group over 70 million people and have a combined gross 
domestic product of about $25,000 million or $350 per person. Since 1980 
regional GDP has declined or stagnated implying a per person fall of the order 
of 15 to 20%. In 1985 there was a positive out-turn but a very low one.
The cost of South African destabilisation and aggression was as high as $7,000 
million in 1 9 8 5, i.e. over 20% of what regional product would have been in the 
absence of the Southern African states1 bad neighbour. As a result the 
economies of two states - Mozambique and Angola except for its oil sector - 
have been reduced to a shambles and only two of the eight main intra-regional 
transport links are operating normally. In the absence of the rising cost of 
destructive engagement with South Africa (including its proxy forces, i.e. 
UNITA, MNR, Super Zapu, Lesotho Liberation Army) there would have been a 
pronounced economic recovery in 1 9 8 5-
However, to summarise across the region obscures significant differences. 
Output per person ranges from over $1,000 in Botswana to perhaps $200 in 
Mozambique. Economic patterns range from Zimbabwe which has the most 
integrated and structurally developed econonomy in Sub-Saharan Africa to 
Lesotho which is in effect a long distance dormitory suburb of the Rand and 
Mozambique where the MNR (created by Portugal and Rhodesia and inherited by 
South Africa) raids have by sabotage and terrorism virtually totally destroyed 
the economy culminating in a 20% fall in output in 1985.
Politically there are also variations. Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and 
Botswana have fully functional broadly based governments with very clear 
positions in support of Southern African economic liberation, development
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oriented to meeting mass needs and the elimination of apartheid and the 
independence of Namibia. The costs of confrontation with South Africa are 
seen as largely unavoidable - support for an accommodationist strategy (while 
not non-existent in business and - in Zambia - trade union circles) is fairly 
muted. However, in Zambia a decade of economic unsuccess has muted support 
for government initiatives generally and in Botswana vulnerability is so high 
that Botswana, like their government, are necessarily more cautious than 
Zimbabweans, Tanzanians or Zambians.
In Angola and Mozambique continued war has prevented a normal political 
process emerging (in Angola) or reversed it (in Mozambique). In both cases 
substantial rural and some urban areas have retreated into avoiding active 
involvement with either the state or proxy forces - the state is unable to 
protect them and the proxy forces are increasingly terrorist and exploitative.
Lesotho and Swaziland are monarchies headed by kings who rule as well as 
reign. Both are committed toward basic needs (perhaps on a noblesse oblige 
basis) and are deeply nationalist and anti-apartheid. However, both are 
forced to act in the context of extreme vulnerability to South African action 
and of significant national elite fractions far more accommodationist in 
attitudes toward RSA than they or the majority of their citizens. Malawi is a 
personalised state awaiting a change in leadership and, as a result, with very 
conflicting policies. Many leaders - and Malawians - are deeply angered and 
concerned by RSA's having virtually blockaded Malawi by cutting almost all 
links to the sea except through South Africa (and a new route to Dar). As a 
result Malawi at that level is a serious and sincere SADCC member. Others 
fear the cost of direct involvement in war and close their eyes to MNR bases 
in and attacks on Mozambique from Malawi. Development orientation and 
practice in Malawi is much more inegalitarian and less basic needs oriented 
than in any other SADCC state - a fact its trade unionists know only too 
well.
In security terms the divergences are equally great. Zimbabwe has relatively 
strong armed forces - it has kept the Beira corridor and the Harare-Tete road 
corridor open for three years against the MNR and assisted Mozambique in other 
counter-offensives against South Africa's proxies. Angola's armed forces have 
become increasingly effective - they and not the Cuban allied forces do almost 
all the fighting against South Africa and the South African/USA UNITA proxy
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forces. Tanzania has a relatively effective army but are out of the direct 
line of combat. Zambia’s armed forces were totally ineffective against 
Rhodesian raids and is an unknown quantity today. Mozambique's armed forces 
have fared badly against Rhodesia, the MNR and South Africa. Whether 
Zimbabwean allied forces and Tanzanian/Portuguese/Zimbabwean training can 
produce a quartum leap in their performance is problematic.
Botswana’s armed forces are more a trip wire than a serious military barrier - 
albeit they did beat off the April 1986 South African raid. Swaziland and 
Lesotho have very small armed forces whose willingness to engage in actual 
combat is problematic while Malawi's army is basically a domestic control 
force which has no other experience.
The Cost Of South Africa To FLS and SADCC
SADCC was founded as an integral part of the independent Southern African 
states' attempt to liberate and to reconstruct their region. It is the 
political economic arm of regionalism as the FLS are the political struggle 
arm. SADCC is about economic liberation; thus it conflicts with South 
Africa's regional total strategy of making Southern Africa safe for South 
African exports, investment, profits and procurement in particular and for the 
apartheid system more generally. South Africa's total strategy views regional 
hegemony as indivisible and domination of transport as key to enforcing 
hegemony. In this its perceptions are the mirror image of SADCC's which - in 
declaration, in programme, in mobilisation of resources and in implementation 
- has put transport and communications delinking first because the sector was 
(and is) perceived as the keystone of South African economic dominance and 
capacity to destabilise by non-military means. Because intra SADCC regional 
routes would be cheaper to use than ones via RSA, could be rehabilitated and 
up-graded over 3 to 5 years and have proved under SADCC fs aegis to have 
substantial external resource mobilisation pull, South Africa has increasingly 
resorted to naked physical violence to block economic liberation in this 
sector.
SADCC in 1985 estimated the 1980-84 cost of economic destabilisation and 
aggression by South Africa against its member States as about $10,000 million 
and the 1985 annual cost at up to $4,000 million. Other estimates are up to
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50% higher on cost to date and place 19 8 5 / 8 6 annual losses up to $7,000 
million. As of 1986 the cost of South Africa's undeclared war on its 
neighbours is running at 10% or more of their output in the absence of that 
war.
This background is critical to understanding why SADCC, like the FLS, has 
consistently called for international pressure on South Africa and has come to 
view sanctions as analagous to the pain of a woman in labour - as Conference 
Chairman Peter Mmusi put it in 1986. That contrasts with regular beatings by 
thugs wielding sjamboks which characterises present reality. Sanctions are 
perceived as crucial to ending, or at least reducing the intensity of, the 
beatings. It also explains the deep distrust for proponents of the line that 
sanctions should be opposed because they would result in South Africa acting 
in ways harmful to its neighbours. Especially in the mouths of those who 
preach "constructive engagement", assist South Africa in destabilisation and 
aggression by co-financing its proxy forces, see South Africa as being a 
region including Southern Africa and/or show little other evidence of concern 
for South or Southern Africans, that argument evokes irritation and often deep 
contempt and bitter anger.
FLS/SADCC On Sanctions
SADCC as a creation and a creature of its member States cannot and does not 
have a position different from them. However, as a channel, a forum and a 
coordinating process SADCC has become more than the least common denominator 
of its member States.
By mid-1985 six SADCC member States (the six Front Line States) were firmly on 
record as advocates of sanctions against South Africa. None saw international 
sanctions as sufficient conditions by themselves but as interacting with and 
complementing the actions of Liberation Movements and the independent states 
in order to minimise the time, economic cost and - especially - human 
suffering and loss of life required. Lesotho had also - in only slightly 
nuanced language - endorsed sanctions, an act of great courage on King 
Moshoeshoe's part given his country's geographic, economic and strategic 
context. It had in addition made the most forceful presentation of the case 
that sanctions should not be allowed to crush the neighbours and opponents of
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apartheid. Zimbabwe had earlier outlined why South Africa's neighbours could 
not be expected to introduce sanctions first nor as fully and fast as other 
states. These positions were reaffirmed at the August 1986 FLS and SADCC 
Summits (and by FLS members at the September Harare Non Aligned Movement 
Conference).
SADCC views the present costs of destabilisation and economic aggression by 
South Africa against its member States and their regional economic liberation 
project as intolerable. SADCC takes South Africa's threat to retaliate 
seriously - as President Quett Masire of Botswana has said South African 
promises are rarely to be taken seriously but her threats always are. It does 
not suppose sanctions would be costless to it nor that they would produce 
immediate results in/on RSA. It sees the logical response to sanctions as
including speeding up SADCC priority programmes and projects desirable in
their own right and therefore yielding lasting benefits as well as entailing
present costs.
The FLS Summit in August 1986 declared that:
In stressing the need for mandatory comprehensive economic 
sanctions against racist South Africa, the leaders 
re-affirmed their endorsement of the resolution... adopted 
by the Twenty-Second Summit of the OAU... and commended it 
for adoption... Concerning South Africa's retaliatory 
measures taken against its neighbours as a result of their 
support for the international campaign for sanctions 
against the regime, the Summit strongly condemned the 
racist regime for its recent trade restrictions against 
Zambia and Zimbabwe... In this respect the Summit appealed 
to the international community to render all possible 
support and assistance to all the Frontline and other 
(Southern African) states in order for them to withstand 
South Africa's retaliatory sanctions against them.
Sanctions' Impact On SADCC Economies
How across the board global sanctions against RSA would affect SADCC economies 
depends on six factors:
First, how far reaching, effectively enforced and speedily applied; 
Second, how long;
Third, whether they work;
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Fourth, whether SADCC states impose full sanctions and if so how rapidly; 
Fifth, how SSA reacts;
Sixth, how much assistance SADCC's cooperating partners provide for the 
capital costs of delinking, the operating costs of replacement employment 
creation for 'returning' migrant workers and enhanced security provision and 
the initial institutional and transitional costs of changing sources and 
routes.
Costs, Cost Containment And Gain Achievement; A Taxonomy
Key sectoral areas are: imports, labour exports, other exports, transport and
communications, security and Lesotho.
Security cannot be left out as non-economic because the main present and 
future obstacles to many delinking initiatives relate to protecting what has 
been built and the economic context in which it operates. Further, without 
better security, economic recovery in most of Angola and Mozambique is 
unlikely.
Lesotho's geographic location and greater dependent integration into the South 
African economy render its position significantly different from those of 
other SADCC member States.
Imports Concerns: Petroleum Products, Electricity, Other, Customs Revenue
Botswana, Swaziland (and Lesotho) are totally, Malawi significantly and 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia marginally, dependent on petroleum products 
supply from or via South Africa. Effective sanctions will cause South Africa 
to halt exports because petroleum products exports depend on crude oil 
imports.
Rerouting and resourcing is possible. The Beira-Mutare and Dar-Ndola 
pipelines plus the Nacala-Blantyre and Maputo-Manzini rail lines have more 
than enough capacity to handle the needs of SADCC States except Angola which 
has its own refinery and Lesotho. Requirements for supplies to Botswana via 
Mutare or Ndola are additional tank wagons and locomotives plus additional
tankage at Beira, Mutare or Ndola and main Botswana depots totalling perhaps 
$50 million. Parallel consideratons apply to supplying Swaziland via Maputo 
and Malawi via Nacala. Alternative sources are likely to be markedly cheaper 
than South African.
Electricity dependence on RSA is total for Lesotho, dominant for Swaziland, 
significant for Mozambique (Maputo area) and Botswana, minor for Zimbabwe. 
Grid links could remove the Swaziland, Mozambique, Botswana and Zimbabwe 
imports from RSA with cost savings over present RSA or alternative national 
sources. Basically they involve a high tension Cahora Basa - Maputo - 
Swaziland link plus high tension lines linking Cahora Basa to the Zimbabwe 
grid and Bulawayo to the Botswana grid. The capital cost would be likely to 
be of the order of $150 million and the construction time up to 24-30 months.
General import dependence on RSA is major (over 75%) for Lesotho, Botswana and 
Swaziland, substantial (over 25%) for Zimbabwe and Malawi and significant 
(over 5$) for Zambia and Mozambique. Alternative sources - in several cases 
(e.g. grain, pulp, textiles, steel) regional ones - exist and global sourcing 
is likely to average at least 10% cheaper than South African if transport is 
available and if importing is handled by knowledgeable commercial houses. The 
absence of import houses or other enterprises able to source globally is near 
total in Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. The evident solution would be joint 
ventures with European or Japanese - or perhaps Zimbabwean - firms with 
experience in global, least cost purchasing. Such ventures could be viable 
even now with the B-L-S states in the South African Customs Union.
SACU is a major revenue source for B-L-S, but for Botswana and Swaziland the 
cash flow from it does not exceed what could be collected from a national 
import and sales tax system which - given functioning transport from SADCC 
ports and global least cost pricing - would not raise average user prices. 
The supposed 41% uplift in SACU revenue allocations is offset by other factors 
including a two year lag in payment and higher RSA product prices. The 
requirement therefore is for functioning duty collection system (the 
recording, valuation, statistical and sales tax branches exist).
In respect to general SADCC State imports (and probably electricity) RSA is 
unlikely to cut off sales in reaction to sanctions. It is more likely to wish 
to retain them to earn foreign exchange and to limit the damage to its export
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oriented sectors, and to manufacturing in particular.
Labour Exports - Miners And Other Workers
Official South African and SADCC member State figures suggest 280,000 to 300, 
000 migrant workers in RSA in 1984. This is an underestimate since seasonal 
(especially agricultural) and illegal (general and domestic) migrants are not 
counted. A full time equivalent figure might be 400,000 to 450,000 plus
2 0 0 , 0 0 0  semi-permanent migrants.
The gold mining core of the migrants are - despite Piet Botha's threats - 
unlikely to be repatriated rapidly. They are skilled and critical to
sustaining gold output - RSA's sanctions proof export. The others - including 
coal miners if iron and steel and coal sanctions bite - could be sent back 
rapidly although 'illegals' and seasonals might take time to find.
There are two aspects of this problem - the loss of say $100-150 million a 
year of remittances and the need to create up to 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 wage or productive 
self employment opportunities.
Goods Exports To And Through RSA
Goods exports by SADCC economies to RSA are under 10% of total exports, 
perhaps $350-400 million a year but are significant for Lesotho, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana. Perhaps a quarter of the total are re-exported by
South Africa so would be readily rerouteable. South African demand for the
balance would fall sharply, even without retaliation. Effective sanctions 
would reduce RSA demand, increase capacity underutilisation and force cuts in 
imports. The bulk could be retargeted - perhaps 15 to 25% to SADCC markets to 
replace RSA exports - but in many cases at lower net proceeds. Perhaps 10 to 
20Í of the exports would prove unsaleable, e.g. certain Zimbabwe labour 
intensive manufactures.
Exports through RSA are a transport problem. Sometimes the problem is very 
limited e.g. Botswana diamonds transit Jan Smuts Airport but could perfectly
well go direct to London. In other cases - e.g. Botswana chilled beef -
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specialised handling facilities not now existing on SADCC railways and at 
SADCC ports are needed. For some exports RSA will seek to apply retaliation - 
as it already has, e.g. by putting Botswana meat export wagons on sidings 
until the contents become putrid. For others it would be happy to ship them 
to earn transit revenue and to create flows of SADCC goods into which to 
insert falsely documented South African products.
Transport And Communications: Cutting The Noose
South Africa today handles the bulk of the external traffic of Lesotho (100Í), 
Botswana (over 90Í) and Swaziland plus over half of that of Zimbabwe, Zambia 
and Malawi. This is largely the result of armed aggression. Of the five main 
port corridors (Maputo - three lines, Beira - to Zimbabwe and Malawi, Nacala, 
Dar es Salaam and Lobito Bay) only Dar has not been attacked repeatedly. 
South Africa via UNITA has kept the Lobito Bay route closed for over a decade 
and via the MNR has at times shut down each of the Mozambique routes. SADCC’s 
priority transport sector programme would virtually eliminate both the need to 
use and the economic logic of using RSA transport links except for Lesotho and 
(on the economic side) Swaziland.
The SADCC Transport and Communications programme over 1985-86 has concentrated 
mobilisation of resources on the Dar and Beira corridors (the Nacala corridor 
and the Maputo-Swaziland projects already have substantial commitments). 
These would cost perhaps $750 million for projects needed to achieve basic 
rehabilitation and upgrading including replacing South African locomotives and 
wagons and could be completed over 36 to 48 months. They would create a 
situation in which Dar es Salaam (Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi), Beira (Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, Mozambique, peripherally Zambia and Malawi), Nacala (Malawi, 
Mozambique) and Maputo (Mozambique, Swaziland only) could handle on the order 
of 12 million tonnes of dry cargo and 4 to 5 million of petroleum product 
imports and exports and their corridors channel these to their destinations. 
That would cover the basic external trade requirements of the seven states 
(Angola has its own ports). That does require higher levels of operating and 
maintenance efficiency than have been attained in the recent past and above 
all security at least comparable to that which Zimbabwean and Mozambican 
forces have provided to the Beira-Zimbabwe corridor since 1983- Were the 
Limpopo Valley Line (Maputo-Zimbabwe) or the Lobito Bay Line (Zambia-Angola)
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also to be rehabilitated, reequipped with rolling stock and traction power, 
restaffed and kept secure there would be enough leeway in capacity to make 
transport dependence a thing of the past.
In respect to air transport infrastructure and to telecommunications SADCC and 
its member States have achieved or are about to complete a set of projects 
which render use of South African facilities both unnecessary and in 
telecommunications also less convenient or economic than national or regional 
ones.
The last transport problem is a specialised one - clearing and forwarding. 
The traffic of the six southern SADCC States (excluding Angola, Zambia and 
Tanzania) is dominantly cleared and forwarded by Renfreight, a subsidiary of 
SAF Marine which is controlled by Old Mutual with a minority Anglo American 
holding. This is a dangerous situation. Withdrawal of RSA personnel and head 
office support could lead to chaos - clearing and forwarding are specialised, 
complex, vital functions. If Renfreight carries out business as usual, first 
it has a bias toward South African sources and routes; second, it has (even 
now) a 'habit* of mislabelling South African cargo both as from another 
country of origin and as shipped from a SADCC port; third, its centralised 
data system means that detailed data on the bulk of six SADCC member States' 
external trade is available on South African computers. Only the most 
innocent could suppose the South African military has no access to these. The 
cure is to build up smaller domestic or non RSA owned clearers and forwarders 
and to form joint ventures with major international ones as Mozambique has 
recently done with AMI (Agence Maritime International) of Belgium.
Security - Winning Room To Delink
Better defence, of key transport routes and other major economic units is 
crucial to cost containment and benefit attainment. SADCC's failure to break 
the transport dependence stranglehold South Africa has created is the result 
of the apartheid use of naked military force.
Selective defence can be achieved through coordinated action as the reopening 
of the Beira port corridor and Malawi-Zimbabwe highway demonstrate. Third,
more can be done - e.g. reopening the Limpopo Valley Line, making
9>
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Maputo-Swaziland routes secure, cutting down (or radically raising the cost 
of) support to proxies by more effective use of airpower. Only in Angola are 
hostilities on a scale out of proportion to potential coordinated independent 
state action. To be reasonably effective such action would cost on the order 
of at least $500 million a year.
International symbolic or trip wire forces might have a deterrent effect if 
RSA feared the external party meant business. An international deterrent 
force with airpower superior to RSA's (which centres on a limited number of 
ageing Mirage jets until the Cheetah variant of the Kphir is phased-in over 
1987-9 0) backed up by air attack warning and other specialist units and 
limited ground forces probably would deter if militarily credible and not of a 
political character allowing South Africa to characterise it convincingly as a 
Soviet advance. A larger, less sophisticated force which could and did fight 
could be effective subject to the same constraints.
Lesotho - The Hostage Of The Drakensberg
Lesotho's economy is basically a long distance bed-sitting room for the Rand. 
The nation is not merely land locked but South Africa locked. In 1986 a brief 
and partial South African economic blockade was followed by a para military 
coup. Leabua Jonathan's attempt to create a Tonton Macjonathan youth guard 
responsible only to himself was the underlying cause and the accession to 
sovereign power of King Moshoeshoe means South Africa scored an own goal with 
the substitution of a more nationalist and more popular government, but the 
potential for turning Lesotho into an isolated, starving concentration camp 
has been demonstrated. South Africa has shown that it believes in economic 
sanctions!
In only a limited number of sectors are domestic solutions identifiable for 
Lesotho. Electricity self sufficiency and some agricultural output 
enhancement could be secured from the Oxbow project. A re-employment 
programme - which would have to be externally funded - could rehabilitate the 
ecology, increase food production and enhance basic services but not create a 
diversified economy or alternative exports.
To break a blockade would require an international airlift of up to 400,000
- 13 -
tonnes a year - shuttle service from Maputo to Lesotho's new international 
airport using fifty 20 tonne capacity cargo planes. Technically this is 
feasible. RSA would be unlikely to shoot down western commercial aircraft. 
The main problem is financial as costs could well exceed $150 million a year 
at $250 per tonne operating costs plus airport upgrading and plane hire.
Crushing Lesotho and starving the Basotho may however, be seen by South Africa 
to offer few gains and significant costs. It needs the gold miners and 
presumably would wish to export an equivalent value to Lesotho. A starving 
mob of over a million Basotho would increase security risks as well as 
bringing international obloquy which might result in tighter sanctions. 
Therefore it is conceivable that RSA would continue to hire Basotho (at least 
in gold mining) and to supply imports. Even that scenario would not be 
costless - at least half the Basotho employed in RSA would probably lose their 
jobs.
Technically a great deal can be done to contain costs to Lesotho but only with 
very high levels of external support. Even then net costs will be more severe 
than for any other SADCC member State.
Total Costs; A Rough Sketch
Any estimate of total costs is a guesstimate because factors which will 
influence the actual outturn are extremely problematic. Assuming:
A. reasonably comprehensive, effective global sanctions;
B. lasting at least three years and not abandoned in despair;
C. phasing in of sanctions by SADCC States;
D. South African economic reaction against SADCC States largely determined
by its own economic interests not maximising damage to its neighbours;
E. a significant SADCC programme of alternative transport and power
construction linked with redirecting and rerouting external transactions;
- 14 -
F. security measures adequate to allow operation of main Indian Ocean SADCC
transport corridors and to reduce general economic distabilisation, the 
costs might be:
1. Capital perhaps $2,000 million over three years dominated by Dar es 
Salaam, Nacala, Beira and Maputo corridor transport ($1250) plus 
electricity transmission and Oxbow generation project in Lesotho ($250).
2. Dislocation and Institution Creation $250-500 million over three years 
primarily initial higher costs of stop gap sourcing, selling and 
transporting and secondarily institution building plus replacement of 
South African export credits.
3. Generation of Alternative Employment for ’returned’ migrant workers (at
3 0 0 , 0 0 0  over the first three years) $1 ,000 million about one half capital 
and one half wages not covered from sales of output. This is a 
guesstimate assuming most non-gold mine workers will be repatriated and 
that an average capital cost of $1,600 an employee will generate labour 
intensive agricultural, urban informal, construction and public service 
employment with total employee/self employed income by year three of 
perhaps $400 million.
4. Security Enhancement $1,750 million over three years basically to train 
and equip a coordinated FLS force to guard key routes and installations. 
This could roughly cover a 10,000 to 15,000 addition to first line combat 
ready personnel in Mozambique (to reopen the Limpopo Valley Line and put 
South Africa’s MNR proxies out of business as a macro-economic or 
macro-security threat), a 5>000 to 1 0 , 0 0 0 augmentation of 
Zimbabwe-Botswana forces on their combined RSA border to limit escalation 
of aggression and a modest increase in jet fighter (especially night 
fighter) capacity to block support of proxies by unarmed night flights 
and to deter raids by helicopters or propeller craft unescorted by front 
line jet fighters (which RSA is probably unwilling to risk). The 
additional cost of a ’block force' would depend on what troops were used 
(e.g. Indian would be lower cost than Swedish) and whether the force is 
seen as a trip wire, a deterrent or an actual combat force.
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5. Lesotho - $300 to $600 million over three years over and above support of 
employment creation. The higher estimate assumeds a major airlift 
operation, the lower a selective one plus sealed rail wagon transport of 
other imports via Maputo and the RSA rail system.
6 . Subtotal - of the order of $6,000 million over three years direct costs. 
The indirect cost total and the net cost total depend on how much of the 
direct cost is internationally financed as additional support for the 
independent states of Southern Africa and how many gains can be achieved.
And Gains
Gains would come on lower import costs, replacing RSA exports in overseas or
regional markets, lower transport costs, benefits of additional regional
import substitution (including transport) and the output of returning workers.
By the third year annual gains could be:
1. Import cost savings $200 million (10% average on imports from or through
RSA)
2. Export gains (existing products) ($ -25 to -50) million
3. Export gains from replacing RSA in overseas markets $25 million, real 
possibilities exist in metals, steel, coal, asbestos, sugar, fruits and 
vegetables, etc., but capitalising on them over three years would be 
limited by existing production and available transport capacity. If $300 
million were invested over that priod and transport routes were open then 
the gains could be up to $150 million.
4. Lower transport costs $200 million (for Zimbabwe alone of the order of 
$100 million on full diversion). However, the level achieved will depend 
on transport sector capacity and security.
5. Additional regional production to replace present South African imports - 
$50 to $100 million goods and up to $300 million transport plus 
associated services. Three year results may be limited by capacity 
constraints.
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6 . Output of returned workers (net) $300 million (of which say $150 public 
sector wages, $125-175 million peasant production, $75-100 million
informal sector output and $50-75 million enterprise wages less $125 
million remittances loss).
7. Output - especially agricultural, mining and manufacturing - made
possible by improved security $200 million (a conservative estimate of 
$300 million gain in Mozambique, partly offset by losses in other
neighbours of RSA. This is a by-product of the security improvement
necessary for transport sector).
Total Gains $1000 to $1500 million
Net Cost During Third Year
Recurrent Net Gain $150 to $650 million
Total Net Cost All Heads $1000 to $1250 million.
These are very rough estimates and may be optimistic. However, they are not
unrealistic 'target’ levels for the third year of sanctions. By year three a
recurrent gain can be achieved (except for Lesotho) with increasd output 
exceeding increased costs. After the third year, costs should not (in real 
terms) rise while benefits should. Excluding security and Lesotho operations, 
the net overall additional cost (financing requirement for capital investment) 
is of the order of $500 million a year for three years and should thereafter 
decline as the initial transport and power capital expenditure was completed.
The costs are much smaller than the present costs of South Africa's
destabilisation and aggression and are therefore logically well worth 
incurring - if financeable - in support of measures with a real chance of 
ending that destabilisation and aggression.
When South Africa becomes a majority rule state SADCC would still have lasting 
gains. Capital spending on transport and power capacity is justified even 
assuming normal economic relations with South Africa. Trade links justified 
on long term mutual interest grounds could be restored easily. No majority 
ruled South Africa would agree to the return of migrant workers given South 
Africa's black unemployment and underemployment position. Finally, only after 
SADCC as a region has built a degree of economic integration and autonomy
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would a regional economic grouping with South Africa avoid building in 
dominance and dependency relations inherited from the old RSA however much 
both the SADCC members and the new South Africa wished to avoid it.
What Is SADCC Doing Now?
SADCC is well aware of the need to contain costs and attain gains when and if 
effective full scale sanctions are imposed against South Africa. It is 
equally aware of the problematic nature of many of the projections. Since the 
1985 Arusha Summit, SADCC has begun serious work on contingency planning and 
its pre-sanctions implementation. Details are - appropriately - secret but 
several elements and directions have been made public by SADCC.
A SADCC member State subcommittee to prepare an overall strategy for SADCC 
responses to sanctions against South Africa has held several meetings. 
Background papers have been prepared and specific topical consultancies 
commissioned. A comprehensive draft sanctions response project was discussed 
at the 1986 Luanda SADCC Summit.
SADCC is giving priority attention to transport routes allowing delinking from 
South Africa and to providing security for them; to petroleum and electricity 
questions and to developing institutional alternatives to South African firms 
in the import/export and clearing and forwarding sectors. Similarly Lesotho's 
requirements as a special case have received attention at the SADCC Summit and 
the 1986 Harare Annual Consultative Conference (including reference to an 
airlift). The 1985-86 emphasis on the Dar es Salaam and Beira transport 
corridors is in effect selective speeding up of the two project groups which 
are most crucial for making cost containment and benefit attainment possible. 
SADCC has moved rapidly to act on its new perception that sanctions against 
South Africa are becoming a real possibility. Its attention is now focused on 
cost containment via speeding up of key elements of SADCC's Lusaka Programme 
of Action. By definition that approach to cost containment can be expected to 
lead to benefit attainment. Its view is that stated by Prime Minister Mugabe 
in June 1986 "We are already suffering? How much more can we suffer? We 
support sanctions because they will shorten the time that we must suffer".
Security is not a SADCC sector, but individually and collectively the member
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States have begun to upgrade key economic unit security. The most evident 
cases are the joint Mozambican-Zimbabwean operations which have secured the 
Beira corridor, reopened the Malawi-Zimbabwe highway, and - less securely - 
allowed restarting of upgrading/rehabilitation of the Nacala rail line. 
Discussions on external security support have been begun with certain 
non-aligned states, almost certainly including India.
Trade Unions And The Front Line: Toward An Action Agenda
Trade unions can have a significant impact on mobilising and influencing 
action to strengthen the front line in Southern Africa. To do so will require 
more articulated and target pressures and actions involving more workers than 
have been common to date. Items for an action agenda include:
1. Press governments to impose and enforce meaningful sanctions against 
South Africa beginning with the 1986 Commonwealth Mini-Summit majority 
(all except UK) and the U.S. Senate packages and broadening them if 
significant changes - as perceived by black South Africans, ANC, SWAPO, 
the FLS, SADCC - are not achieved.
2. Develop information systems to identify loopholes and to bring them to 
the attention of authorities and of the press. For example, the Cheetah 
fighter depends on electronic and weapon systems, jet engines and basic 
design imports. These violate an existing sanction which is purportedly 
enforced. Whence the electonics, avionics, weapons, engines? How did 
South Africa acquire the Kphir design? Trade unionists should be well 
placed to dig out the answers.
3. Lobby governments to support key SADCC programmes especially in respect 
to port corridors, pipelines and petroleum storage, electricity 
generation and transmission. Both SADCC and SATUCC should be consulted 
in identifying projects and progrmmes to highlight.
4. Articulate - with SATUCC and official or unofficial Basotho - an 
emergency survival programme for Lesotho including Oxbow dam, job 
creation for ex-migrants, at least a limited airlift and press 
governments and the EEC to act on the first two elements and have at
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least contingency plans for the third.
5. Together with SATUCC, ILO/JASPA and Ministries of Labour of Botswana, 
Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique identify the components for a programme 
to re-train and re-employ 25,000 to 50,000 migrant workers a year and to 
raise (including from governments and international organisations) 
funding and personnel (who could well be union members) to launch 
full-scale action when (and it probably is when, not if) South Africa 
begins major repatriation of Southern African workers.
6 . Push for South African quotas, access rights and preferences (formal and 
informal), e.g. sugar, textiles, iron and steel, coal to be reallocated 
immediately to SADCC member States.
7. Urge governments to assist SADCC member States in reorienting their trade 
away from RSA - a set of actions OECD governments should perceive as 
benefitting their own export and employment levels. Areas within this 
include: provision of export credit to replace South African, better 
trade promotion and commercial information provision, assisting in 
identifying (and financing development of links with) appropriate 
purchasing organisations and/or partners for SADCC regional or member 
State based joint venture trading and clearing/forwarding firms.
8 . Press for South African aggression against Southern Africa to be met by 
serious retaliatory action by OECD member states. In particular press 
for breaking all contacts with and expelling all offices of South African 
proxy bodies notably MNC and UNITA. It is a scandal that RSA and its 
proxies have waged full scale wars against their neighbours for up to a 
decade with no effective international action to stop them taken. If 
ever the "threat to the peace" provisions of the UN Charter apply, they 
do so in respect to South Africa's regional aggression.
9. Seek to mobilise government support for national and FLS build up of
effective security forces to defend themselves. Requirements include 
finance, equipment and training personnel.
10. Seek to build up support for an international (or coordinated national)
force to protect the frontline from South African and proxy incursions.
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The auspices under which such a force could go require consideration and 
consultation with the FLS. United Nations or Commonwealth sponsorship 
would appear to have advantages over purely national forces.
11 . Build up a more articulated and intensive programme to inform union
officials and members of the nature of South African attacks on the 
frontline so that trade union statements and actions have a broader and 
better informed mass base.
12. Develop closer links - at Trade Union Congress, National Union, local
Union Council, Branch and individual trade unionist levels - between 
union and other concerned organsiation initiatives and seek both to 
initiate and participate in coordinated campaigns with, e.g. church, 
womens, farmers and specialised action groups. At the same time build up 
better information acquisition and consultative links not only with 
SATUCC but also with the FLS, SADCC and individual Southern African 
states.
- R. H. Green 
Falmer
September 1986
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PAPER 3: STRENGTHENING THE FRONTLINE
Introduction
1 The Frontline States (FLS) (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe) and the broader Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC) grouping (the FLS plus Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi) have been 
on average hard hit by three factors. First, the general post-1979 economic 
crises affecting sub-Saharan Africa, second, by recurrent droughts over 1979-1984 
and third, by the rising tide of South African aggression and destabilisation 
beginning with the 1975 invasion of Angola and becoming steadily more damaging 
since 1980.
2 The SADCC economies group over 70 million people and have a combined 
gross domestic product of about $25,000 million or $350 per person. Since 1980 
regional GDP has declined or stagnated implying a per person fall of the order 
of 15 to 20%. In 1985 there was a positive out-turn but a very low one.
3 The cost of South African destabilisation and aggression was as high as 
$7 , 0 0 0  million in 1985, i.e. over 2 0% of what regional product would have been 
in the absence of the Southern African states’ bad neighbour. As a result the 
economies of two states - Mozambique and Angola except for its oil sector - 
have been reduced to a shambles and only two of the eight main intra-regional 
transport links are operating normally. In the absence of the rising cost of 
destructive engagement with South Africa (including its proxy forces, i.e. UNITA 
and MNR), there would have been a pronounced economic recovery in 1985.
4 However, to summarise across the region obscures significant differences.
Output per person ranges from over $1,000 in Botswana to perhaps $200 in 
Mozambique. Economic patterns range from Zimbabwe which has the most integrated 
and structurally developed economy in the sub-region to Mozambique where the MNR 
(created by Portugal and Rhodesia and inherited by South Africa) raids have by 
sabotage and terrorism virtually totally destroyed the economy culminating in
a 2 0% fall in output in 1985.
The Cost of South Africa to Neighbouring States
5 SADCC was founded as an integral part of the independent Southern African 
states' attempt to liberate and to reconstruct their region. It is the political 
economic arm of regionalism as the FLS are the political struggle arm. SADCC is 
about economic liberation; thus it conflicts with South Africa's regional total 
strategy of making Southern Africa safe for South African exports, investment, 
profits and procurement in particular and for the apartheid system more generally.
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for adoption... Concerning South Africans retaliatory 
measures taken against its neighbours as a result of theii 
support for the international campaign for sanctions 
agais.st the regime, the Summit strongly condemned the 
racist regime for its recent trade restrictions against 
Zambia and Zimbabwe... In this respect the Summit appealed 
to the international community to render ail possible 
support and assistance to all the Frontline and other 
(Southern African) states in order for them to withstand 
South Africa's retaliatory sanctions against them. 11
Sanctions Impact on SADCC Ec.onoaies
12 How across the board global sanctions against South Africa would affect SADCC 
economies depends on a number of factors. First, how far reaching, effectively 
enforced and speedily applied; second, how long; third, whether they work, 
fourth, whether SADCC states impose full sanctions and if so how rapidly; fifth
how South Africa reacts; sixth how much assistance SADCC's co-operating partners 
provide for the capital costs of delinking, the operating costs of replacement 
employment creation for 'returning' migrant workers and enhanced security 
provision and the initial institutional and transitional costs of changing 
sources and routes.
13 Key sectoral areas are: imports, migrant labour, exports, transport
and communications, security and Lesotho. Security cannot qe left out as 
non-economic because the main present and future obstacles to many delinking 
initiatives relate to protecting what has been built and the economic context 
in which it operates. Further, without better security, economic recovery in 
most of Angola and Mozambique is unlikely. Lesotho's geographic location 
and greater dependent integration into the South African economy render its 
position significantly different from those of other SADCC member states.
An Independent Import Strategy for SADCC
1A Botswana, Swaziland, and Lesotho are totally, Malawi significantly and
Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia marginally, dependent on petroleum products 
supply from or via South Africa. Effective sanctions will cause South Africa 
to halt exports because petroleum products exports depend on crude oil imports. 
Rerouting and resourcing is possible. The Beira-Mutare and Dar-Ndola pipelines 
plus the Nacala-Blantyre and Maputo-Manzini rail lines have more than enough 
capacity to handle the needs of SADCC States excpefc Angola which has its own 
refinery and Lesotho. Requirements for supplies to Botswana via Mutare or 
Ndola are additional tank wagons and locomotives plus additional tankage at 
Beira, Mutare or Ndola and main Botswana depots totalling perhaps $50 million. 
Parallel considerations apply to supplying Swaziland via Maputo and Malawi via 
Nacala. Alternative sources are likely to be markedly cheaper than South African.
15 Electricity dependence on South Africa is total for Lesotho, dominant 
for Swaziland, significant for Mozambique (Maputo) area and Botswana, minor 
for Zimbabwe. Grid links could remove the Swaziland, Mozambique, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe imports from South Africa with cost savings over present South African 
or alternative national sources. Basically they involve a high tension Cahora 
Basa - Maputo - Swaziland link plus high tension lines linking Cahora Basa to 
the Zimbabwe grid and Bulawayo to the Botswana grid. The capital cost would
be likely to be of the order of $150 million and the construction time up to 
2A-30 months.
16 General import dependence on South Africa is major (over 75%) for Lesotho, 
Botswana and Swaziland, substantial (over 25%) for Zimbabwe and Malawi and 
significant (over 5%) for Zambia and Mozambique. Alternative sources - in
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several cases (e.g. grain, pulp, textiles, steel) regional ones - exist and 
global sourcing is likely to average at least 10% cheaper than South African if 
transport is available and if importing if handled by knowledgeable commercial 
houses. The problem of import houses or other enterprises able to source 
globally is serious in many countries. The solution would be joint ventures 
with European or Japanese - or perhaps Zimbabwean - firms with experience 
in global, least cost purchasing. Such ventures could be viable even now 
with the B-L-S states in the South African customs union.
17 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is an import tax collection 
system run by South Africa and including Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It is 
a major revenue source for Lesotho and significant for Botswana and Swaziland. 
However the revenue raised by this system for Botswana and Swaziland could 
feasibly be replaced by new national import and sales tax systems especially in the 
context of a redirection of trade through SADCC ports and a regional strategy
for discount import purchasing. The SACU system is also not costless for the 
BLS states. Firstly there is a two year delay before revenue is received.
Secondly because certain key imports are now at premium prices as a result of 
levies due to routing through South Africa, it should be possible, in the context 
of a new co-operative SADCC import strategy (i.e. bulk buying at a discount), 
to maintain tax revenues without raising final prices.
18 If SADCC were to embark on a comprehensive and effective new import strategy 
to counteract dependence, South Africa might retaliate by cutting off its
exports to the region (e.g. electricity). However this is by no means certain 
since retaliation would hurt its own economy at a time when it is likely to 
be under pressure from international sanctions.
Migrant Workers
19. Official South Africa and SADCC member State figures suggest 280,COO to
300,000 migrant workers from the region in South Africa in 1984. This is an 
underestimate since seasonal (especially agricultural) and illegal (general 
and domestic) migrants are not counted. A full time equivalent figure might 
by 400,000 to 450,000 plus 200,000 semi-permanent migrants. The gold mining 
core of the migrants are - despite Piet Botha’s threats - unlikely to be 
repatriated rapidly. They are skilled and critical to sustaining gold output.
The others - including coal miners if iron and steel and coal sanctions bite - 
could be sent back rapidly although 'illegals' and seasonals might take time to 
find. There are two aspects of this problem - the loss of say $100-150 million 
a year of remittances and a need to create up to 300,000 wage or productive self 
employment opportunities.
Goods Exports to and through South Africa
Goods exports by SADCC economies to South Africa (as opposed to through 
South Africa) are under 10% of total exports, perhaps $350-400 million a 
year but are significant for Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Botswana. Perhaps 
a quarter of this to.tal are re-exported by South Africa so would be readily 
rerouteable. South African demand for the balance would fall sharply, even 
without retaliation. Effective sanctions would reduce demand in South Africa, 
increase capacity underutilisation and force cuts in imports. The bulk of SADCC 
exports could be retargeted - perhaps 15 to 25% within the region replacing 
South African exports - but in many cases at lower net proceeds. Perhaps 10 to 
20% of the exports might prove unsaleable (e.g. certain Zimbabwe labour 
intensive manufactures).
21 Exports through South African are a transport problem. Sometimes the problem
is very limited e.g. Botswana diamonds transit .lan Smuts Airport but could 
perfectly well go direct to London. In other cases - e.g. Botswana chilled beef -
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• specialised handling facilities not now existing on SADCC railways and at SADCC 
ports are needed.
«
Transport and Communications: Cutting the Noose
22 South Africa today handles the bulk of the external traffic of Lesotho
(100%), Botswana (over 90%) and Swaziland plus over half of that of Zimbabwe,
Zambia, and Malawi. This is largely the result of armed aggression. Of the 
five main port corridors (Maputo - three lines, Beira - to Zimbabwe and Malawi, 
Nacala, Dar es Salaam and Lobito Bay) only Dar has not been attacked repeatedly. 
South Africa, via UNITA, has kept the Lobito Bay route closed for over a decade 
and, via the MNR, has at times shut down each of the Mozambique routes.
SADCC's priority transport sector programme would virtually eliminate both the need 
to use and the economic logic of using transport links through South Africa
except for Lesotho and (on the economic side) Swaziland.-’
23 The SADCC Transport and Communications programme over 1985-86
has concentrated mobilisation of resources on the Dar and Beira corridors (the 
Nacala corridor and the Maputo-Swaziland projects already have substantial 
commitments). These would cost perhaps $750 million for projects needed to 
achieve basic rehabilitation and upgrading including replacing South African 
locomotives and wagons and could be completed over 36 to A8 months. They would 
create a situation in which Dar es Salaam (Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi), Beira 
(Zimbabwe, Botswana, Mozambique, peripherally Zambia and Malawi), Nacala (Malawi, 
Mozambique) and Maputo (Mozambique,Swaziland only) could handle on the order 
of 12 million tonnes of dry cargo and A to 5 million of petroleum product 
imports and exports and their corridors channel these to their destinations. That 
would cover the basic external trade requirements of the seven states (Angola has 
its own ports). That does require higher level of operating and maintenance 
efficiency than have been attained in the recent past and above all security 
at least comparable to that which Zimbabwean and Mozambican forces have 
provided to the Beira-Zimbabwe corridor since 1983. Were the Limpopo Valley 
Line (Maputo-Zimbabwe) or the Lobito Bay Line (Zambia-Angola) also to be rehabil­
itated, reequipped with rolling stock and traction power, restaffed and kept secure 
there would be enough leeway in capacity to make transport dependence a thing of 
the past.
2A In respect to air transport infrastructure and to telecommunications SADCC
and its member States have achieved or are about to complete a set of projects 
which render use of South African facilities both unecessary and in 
telecommunications also less convenient or economic than national or regional ones.
25 The last transport problem is a specialised one - clearing and forwarding.
The traffic of the six southern SADCC States (excluding Angola, Zambia, and 
Tanzania) is dominently cleared and forwarded by Renfreight, a subsidiary of 
SAR Marine which is controlled by Old Mutual with a minority Anglo American 
holding. This is a dangerous situation. Withdrawal of South African personnel 
and head office support could lead to chaos - clearing and forwarding are 
specialised, complex, vital functions. If Renfreight carries out business as usual, 
first it has a bias toward South African sources and routes; second, it has (even 
now) a 'habit' of mislabelling South African cargo both as from another country 
of origin and as shipped fron a SADCC port; third, its centralised data system 
means that detailed data on the bulk of six SADCC member States' external trade 
is available on South African computers. Only the most innocent could suppose 
the South African military has no access to these. The cure is to build up 
smaller domestic or non South African owned clearers and forwarders and to form 
joint ventures with major international ones such as Mozambique has recently 
done with AMI (Agence Maritime International) of Belgium.
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Security ~ Winning Room to De 1 ink
26 Better defence of key transport routes and other major economic units is
crucial to cost containment and benefit attainment. SADCC's failure to break 
the transport dependence stranglehold South Africa has created is largely the 
result of the apartheid use of naked military force. Selective defence can 
be achieved through co-ordinated action as the reopening of the Beira port 
corridor and Malawi-Zimbabwe highway demonstrate. More can be done along these 
lines to make transport links secure, especially by the more effective use 
of airpower against proxies, e.g. re-opening the Limpopo Valley Line and the 
Maputo-Swaziland routes. However, it has to be recognised that hostilities in 
Angola are probably on a scale which pose greater problems. To be reasonably 
effective such action would cost on the order of at least $500 million a year.
*'•27 International defence or even trip wire forces might have a deterrent
effect if South Africa feared the external party meant business. A relatively 
small international deterrent force with airpower superior to that of the Pretoria 
regimes (which centres on a limited number of ageing Mirage jets until the 
Cheetah variant of the Kphir is phased-in over 1987-90), backed up by air 
attack warning, other specialist units and limited ground forces probably would 
deter aggression. A larger but less sophisticated force which could and did 
fight could also be effective. The credibility of this force would depend 
both on its military capacity to respond to aggression and its composition.
In political terms it would be important to compose a force from countries 
demonstrably uninterested in a permanent military presence in the region.
Lesotho’s special problems
28 Lesotho, landlocked by South Africa has especially difficult problems
in de-linking economically from South Africa and securing its boundaries. However, 
a number of projects could be implemented with external aid to increase 
agricultural and energy self-sufficiency, improve basic services, and create jobs 
for returning migrant workers. The international community should also be 
prepared to implement at short notice the massive emergency airlift that would 
be needed if South Africa tried to blockade the country. Similar contingency plans 
for emergency resettlement in neighbouring states for Basutho expelled from 
South African should also be arranged.
Costing a Comprehensive Programme for Strengthening the Frontline
29 Any estimate of total costs of the strategy outlined in this paper is a 
difficult because factors which will influence the actual out turn are extremely 
unpredictable. However, assuming that reasonably comprehensive, effective 
global sanctions are implemented for at least three years; that SADCC states 
phase in sanctions; that South African economic reaction against SADCC states is 
largely determined by its own economic interests rather than maximising damage 
to its neighbours; that a significant SADCC programme of alternative transport 
and power construction linked with redirecting and rerouting external 
transactions is put in place; and that security measures adequate to allow the 
operation of the main Indian Ocean SADCC transport corridors and to reduce 
general economic destabilisation, the costs might be as follows:-
i) Capital - perhaps $2,000 million over three years dominated by Dar es Salaam, 
Nacala, Beira, and Maputo corridor transport ($1,250 million) plus electricity 
transmission and the Oxbow power generation project in Lesotho ($250 million).
ii) Dislocation and Institution Creation - $250-500 million over three years 
consisting primarily of initial higher costs of stop gap sourcing, selling and 
transporting, and secondarily building new trading institutions plus replacement 
of South African export credits.
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A iii) Generation of Alternativa Employment - for 'returned* migrant workers
(at 300,000 over the first three years) $1,000 million about one half capital 
« and one half wages not covered from sales of output. This is a guesstimate
assuming most non-gold mine workers will be repatriated and that an average 
capital cost of $1,600 an employee will generate labour intensive agricultural, 
urban informal, construction and public service employment with total employee/ 
self employed income by year three of perhaps $400 million.
iv) Security Enhancement - $1,750 million over three years basically to 
train and equip a co-ordinated forcé to guard key routes and installations. This 
could roughly cover a 10,000 to 15,000 addition to first line combat ready 
personnel in Mozambique (to reopen the Limpopo Valley Line and put South Africa's 
MNR proxies out of business as a macro-economic or macro-security threat), a
5,000 to 10,000 augmentation of Zimbabwe-Botswana forces on their combined South 
African border to limit escalation of aggression and a modest increase in jet 
fighter (especially night fighter) capacity to block support of proxies by 
^•unarmed night fighters and to deter raids by helicopters or propeller craft 
unescorted by front line jet fighters (which South Africa is probably unwilling 
to risk). The additional cost of an international defence force would depend 
on its size,sophistication and composition.
v) Lesotho - $300 to $600 million over three years over and above support 
of employment creation. The higher estimate assumes a major airlift operation, 
the lower a selective one plus some rail transport of other imports via Maputo 
and the South African rail system.
30. The total direct costs of these five elements of a comprehensive programme
would be of the order of $6 billion over three years. The cost to the region depends 
on how much of the direct cost is internationally financed as additional 
support for the independent states of Southern Africa and how many gains can be 
achieved.
Short term gains from a Support Programmes
31 Gains would come in the form of lower import costs, increased exports
replacing South African exports blocked by sanctions in overseas or regional 
markets, lower transport costs, benefits of additional regional import 
substitution (including transport) and the output of returning workers. By the 
third year total gains could be about $1 to $1.5 billion. Gains would gradually 
build up and by the third year might be expected to be made up annually as follows:
i) Import Cost Savings - $200 million (10% average on imports from or through 
South Africa).
ii) Export Gains from replacing South Africa in overseas markets $25 million. 
Real possibilities exist in metals, steel, coal, asbestos, sugar, fruits and 
vegetables, etc., but capitalising on them over three years would be limited 
by existing production and available transport capacity. If $300 million were 
invested over that period and tranport routes were open then the gains would be 
perhaps $150 million. This would have to offset against some export losses which 
might be estimated at between $25 to 50 million.
iii) Lower Transport Costs $200 million (for Zimbabwe) alone of the order of
$100 million on full diversion). However, the level achieved will depend on
transport sector capacity and security.
iv) Additional regional production to replace present South African imports - 
$50 to $100 million goods and up to $300 million transport plus associated services; 
Three year results may be limited by capacity constraints.
v) Output of returned workers (net) - $300 million (of which say $150 public
sector wages, $125-175 million rural worker production, $75-100 million informal 
sector output and $50-75 million enterprise wages, less $125 million remittances
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loss),
vi) Output - especially agricultural, mining and manufacturing made possible 
by increased security $200 million (a conservative estimate of $300 million 
gain in Mozambique, partly offset by losses in other neighbours of South Africa. 
This is a by-product of the security improvement necessary for the transport 
sector).
Cost and Benefits of Programme for Strengthening the Frontline
32 By the third and subsequent years of the programme recurrent gain should 
exceed the continuing need for investment by about $150-$650 million annually 
even allowing for total annual costs of the order of $1 billion annually.
These are very rough estimates and may be optimistic. However, they are not 
unrealistic 'target’ levels for the third year of a programme to strengthen the 
frontline. By year three a recurrent gain could be achieved with increased 
output exceeding increased costs. After the third year, costs should stabilise 
or even fall while benefits should rise. Additional financing for capital 
investment would be required of the order of $500 million a year for three more 
years but should thereafter decline as the initial transport and power capital 
expenditure was completed. Security and emergency relief to Lesotho would be 
additional variable costs largely dependent on what would be required to 
counteract South African aggression. However, even allowing for this the total net 
costs are much smaller than the present costs of South Africa's destabilisation 
and aggression and are therefore logically well worth incurring - if financeable
- in support of measures with a real chance of ending that destabilisation and 
aggression.
33 When South Africa becomes a majority rule state SADCC would still have 
lasting gains. Capital spending on transport and power capacity is justified 
even assuming normal economic relations with South Africa. Trade links justified 
on long term mutual interest grounds could be restored easily. A majority
rule South Africa may not be able to agree to the return of migrant workers 
given South Africa's black unemployment and underemployment position. Finally, 
only after SADCC as a region has built a degree of economic integration and 
autonomy would a regional economic grouping with South Africa avoid building in 
dominance and dependency relations inherited from apartheid however much both 
the SADCC members and the new South Africa wished to avoid it.
What is SADCC doing now?
34 SADCC is well aware of the need to contain costs and attain gains when
and if effective full scale sanctions are imposed against South Africa. It is
equally aware of the problematic nature of many of the projections. Since the 
1985 Arusha Summit, SADCC has begun serious work on contingency planning and its 
pre-sanctions implementation. Details are appropriately confidential but several 
elements and directions have been made public by SADCC.
35 A SADCC member State subcommittee to prepare an overall strategy for SADCC 
responses to sanctions against South Africa has held several meetings. Background 
papers have been prepared and specific topical consultancies commissioned. A 
comprehensive draft sanctions response project was discussed at the 1986 Luanda 
Summit.
36 SADCC is giving priority attention to transport routes allowing delinking
from South Africa and to providing security for them; to petroleum and electricity 
questions and to developing institutional alternatives to South African firms
in the import/export and clearing and forwarding sectors. Similarly Lesotho's 
requirements as a special case have received attention at the SADCC Summit 
and the 1986 Harare Annual Consultative Conference (including reference to an 
airlift). The 1985-86 emphasis on the Dar es Salaam and Beira transport
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corridors is in effect selective speeding up < f the two project groups which 
are most crucial for making cost containment and benefit attainment possible. 
SADCC has moved rapidly to act on its new perception that sanctions against 
South Africa are becoming a real possibility. Its attention is now focused 
on cost containment via speeding up of key elements of SADCC's Lusaka Programme 
of Action. By definition that approach to cost containment can be expected to 
lead to benefit attainment.
37 Security is not at present a matter discussed within the SADCC framework,
but individually and collectively the member States have begun to upgrade key 
economic unit security. The most evident cases are the joint Mozambican- 
Zimbabwean operations which have secured the Beira corridor, reopened the Malawi- 
Zimbabwe highway, and - less securely - allowed restarting of upgrading/ 
rehabilitation of the Nacala rail line.
SUMMARY: The Main Elements of an International Programme to Strengthen the
Frontline
- The Pretoria regime sees the Southern African sub-region as an area of its
economic domain, and wants to make it secure for its exports, investments,
profits and procurement, and for the apartheid system itself. South Africa 
also sees its regional hegemony as indivisible, and its domination of the 
transport system is the key to enforcing it.
- To enforce this, the regime has, over the years, consistently attacked and
destroyed key transport routes and installations directly or through proxies
such as the MNR and UNITA, and the cost of this destruction to the SADCC
countries is now estimated at US$ 7 billion per year.
- SADCC was established to foster the economic liberation of its members 
from the Pretoria regime's domination. Established in 1980, SADCC has put 
transport and communication delinking with South Africa as its top priority.
- As economic sanctions against the Pretoria regime are now a reality, it is 
now more urgent than ever that a programme of disengagement be implemented, to 
avoid the possibility of making SADCC countries hostage nations of the regime 
through the implementation of its own retaliatory sanctions.
- The resources to undertake this task are at this stage beyond the means 
available in the region. It is therefore important that the international
community should join hands with SADCC countries to mobilise the resources
needed to make this a reality.
- The programme of action should include;
i restoring transport routes to enable the redirecting and rerouting of external 
trade, and developing a regional energy programme independent of South Africa. 
This essentially involves Dar es Salaam, Nacala, Beira, and Maputo transport 
corridors and new electricity transmission lines.
ii new job opportunities for up to 380,000 returned migrant workers be created.
iii a trained and equipped international defence force, to guard key routes and 
installations.
iv provision for the special situation of Lesotho.
- This would cost US$ 6 billion for a period of about 3 years, but should yield 
gains of the order of US$ 1 billion to US$ 1.5 billion by the third year.
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Trade Unions and the Frontline: Towards a Programme of Action
Trade unions have an important role in mobilising and influencing action 
to strengthen the frontline. This role has to be utilised with maximum effect, 
particularly on governments and the public. The Conference may therefore wish to 
consider specific proposals for action in respect to:
- support SADCC programmes particularly in. respect to port 
corridors, pipelines, petroleum storage, electricity generation 
and transmission;
- assist SADCC member states in reorientating trade away from South 
Africa including the provision of export credit to replace South 
Africa, better trade promotion and commercial information, assistance 
in identifying and financing development links with appropriate pur­
chasing organisations, and or partners for SADCC regional or member 
state joint venture trading and clearing/forwarding firms;
provide sufficient funds to formulate and implement programmes 
together with trade unions on retraining and re-employment of 
migrant workers;
- accede to SADCC countries request for South African quotas, access 
rights and preferences (formal and informal), e.g. sugar, textiles, 
iron and steel, coal to be reallocated immediately to SADCC member 
states;
- break all contacts with and expel all offices of the South African 
proxy bodies such as MNR and UNITA;
- support for an international or regional force to protect the front­
line from South African proxies and incursions. The force should be 
from countries demonstrably uninterested in a permanent military 
presence in the region.
The ICFTU, together with SATUCC and the various trade union centres, 
should develop programmes, aimed at creating employment opportunities for migrant 
workers in Southern Africa.
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